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Abstract: After  demonstrating  that  there  is  a  certain  deficit  within  the  existing 
sociological reflection on power, this article discusses the possible benefit of consulting 
Alfred Schutz’s theory of relevance for the study of power relations. Especially, Schutz’s 
distinction between “intrinsic” and “imposed” relevances is reconsidered at length. 
The thesis claims that an application of Schutz’s concepts can be of some original 
use, particularly in exploring the perspective of those subject to power, however this 
application calls for some theoretical revision.
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Resumo: Após demonstrar que há um certo déficit na reflexão sociológica disponível 
sobre poder, o artigo discute o possível benefício de consultar a teoria da relevância 
de Alfred Schutz para o estudo de relações de poder. Em especial, a distinção de 
Schutz entre relevância “intrínseca” e “imposta” é reconsiderada detidamente. A tese 
sustenta que uma adoção dos conceitos de Schutz podem ser originais, particularmente 
ao explorer a perspectiva daqueles sujeitos de poder, entretanto, esta aplicação exige 
alguma revisão teórica. 
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Introduction: outlining the problem
Power is omnipresent – this fundamental statement not only applies to 
social reality but also to its study within sociological theory. When thinking 
about social relationships, one cannot ignore the importance of power, which 
has, consequently, been one of the central subjects for social scientists of all 
types since the dawn of the field. At the beginning of the 20th century, Bertrand 
Russell declared “that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in 
the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics” (Russell 
1957, p. 10). Later on, Robert Dahl stated that “the concept of power is as 
ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast” (Dahl, 1957, p. 201). 
Norbert Elias claimed that “balances of power … form an integral element of 
all human relationships” (Elias, 1978, p. 74), and Heinrich Popitz argued “that 
the bacillus power is inherent in all human relationships” (Popitz, 1992, p.  21)1. 
From the standpoint of systems theory, Niklas Luhmann conceived of power as 
a “symbolically generalized medium of communication” (Luhmann, 1979).
These quotations are a more or less random selection from the scientific 
pool of citations; similar statements could be found in nearly every theoretical 
paradigm of sociology. It is Max Weber to whom we owe the insight that 
power is not some kind of essence which adheres to the individual who is 
in possession of it, but a social “construction” emerging from intersubjective 
processes.  Weber’s  genealogical  studies  on  domination2  make  clear  that 
power is not a personal trait developed within a solipsistic sphere; it rather 
refers to an attribution that occurs within social relationships: one person 
(or a group of persons) ascribes certain traits to another person and this very 
circumstance enables the second person to assert his/her will. This attribution 
can rest on “objective” criteria, such as physical strength, yet the aspect of 
the phenomenon that is of primary sociological interest, is the way in which 
social patterns of perception, judgment, and behavior are built upon the basis 
of such criteria. These patterns cannot be attributed to particular social actors; 
instead they demonstrate the fundamental intersubjectivity of power. In short, 
sociology is less concerned with power, than it is with power relations. Norbert 
Elias put it as follows: “Power is not an amulet possessed by one person   
and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of human relationships” 
(Elias, 1978, p. 74).
This fundamental insight into the relational character of the phenomenon 
brings into focus the “between” of a social relationship, which requires (at 
1  Translation by A.G. The German original reads: “daß der Bazillus Macht in allen menschlichen 
Beziehungen steckt”.
2  In sub-volume II of the German version of Economy and Society.   A. Goettlich – Power and powerlessness  493
least) one person performing power and (at least) one other person subjected 
to this same power. Typically, this “between” is approached in one of two 
or three different ways: (1) one can seek a “direct” approach by focusing on 
societal elements of a structural nature which somehow determine the behavior 
of social actors – I will call this the “structuralistic” approach. It assumes that 
for any study on the nature of power it is crucial to know about such structures, 
and not so much about how people conceive of them. (2) One can analyze the 
“between” by studying its meaning for the persons involved – I will call this the 
“individualistic” approach. It assumes that intersubjective structures become 
apparent only in the behavior of individual social actors and therefore can only 
be explored by studying individual actions. The “individualistic” approach can 
be further subdivided into (a) the analysis of the person performing power and 
(b) the analysis of the person who is subjected to this power.
Having said this, I should add that the distinction between the two types 
of approaches focuses on the different starting points of the two paradigms, 
not on their results, which may be quite similar. Therefore they do not stand 
in a contradiction to each other.3 This paper is foremost concerned with the 
“individualistic” approach.
Given the fact that the conception of power as a relationship between at 
least two individuals owes considerably to Max Weber, his definition of power, 
which is still the most prominent one within the discipline, seems to be curiously 
one-sided, since it only looks at the performer of power: “Power is the probability 
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” 
(Weber, 1968, p. 53). At first glance, Weber’s focus may be perceived as being 
self-evident. Since he is concerned with power instead of powerlessness, then 
the concentration on the performer of power appears sound. Yet, if we take his 
insight seriously with regards to the relational character of power, his definition 
appears to be one-sided, as it largely ignores the perspective of the person who 
is exposed to power. One man’s chance to dominate is another man’s risk of 
being dominated. This aspect is somehow reflected in Weber’s use of the term 
“resistance”, but he does not elaborate on it.
Now, Weber’s definitional bias did not mislead him into only studying 
the perspective of the performer of power, since he was clearly aware of 
the constitutive role played by those ascribing power to other persons. His 
exploration of this perspective, however, ends at the very point that his cognitive 
interest extends to – an interest marked by the popular dictum of David Hume: 
3  It can be further added that the distinction is ideal-typical. Concrete sociological theories may 
therefore fall under both categories, like e.g. Elias’s theory of figuration (1978).494  Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 11, n. 3, p. 491-508, set.-dez. 2011
“Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with 
a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by 
the few” (Hume, 2002, p. 29). Weber’s sociological reflections can be read 
as an answer to the question inherent to Hume’s statement: how is it that 
the few are allowed to govern the many? Accordingly, Weber’s genealogical 
studies end at the point where this question is answered satisfactorily, and he 
is, therefore, not interested in the further consequences of powerlessness for 
those experiencing it in everyday life.
This  bias  becomes  apparent  in  the  fact  that,  when  taking Weber’s 
definition as a basis, powerlessness is a mere residual category which can 
only be defined ex negativo, that is, as the lacking of something else. Still 
the relation is an asymmetric one: someone who has power has the chance to 
manipulate his fellow men and he can make use of this power; on the other 
hand we cannot say that someone “has” powerlessness or that he “makes use” 
of his risk to be manipulated by others.
Another popular definition of power has been provided by Heinrich 
Popitz. According to him, power is “the ability to prevail over external 
forces” (Popitz, 1992, p. 22)4. I touch on this (not specifically sociological) 
definition, because it clearly hints at an anthropological background, which 
necessarily stands behind every theory of power – explicitly or implicitly. As 
most conceptions of power do, Popitz’ formula conceives of man as “homo 
faber” (Scheler, 2009), as “animal laborans” (Arendt, 1959), who, through his 
work, appropriates his natural surroundings (Marx, 1961). In the same vein, 
starting from fundamental reflections on man’s position in the world, Helmuth 
Plessner, in his Philosophical Anthropology, holds a general “conception of 
man as power” (Plessner, 1981, p. 189)5. However, this notion of man’s agency 
is by no means the exclusive intellectual property of philosophers, as is shown 
by the Christian idea of mankind subduing the earth (Genesis 1, 28).
Cultural comparison demonstrates that other religions have different 
notions of The Human Place in the Cosmos (Scheler, 2009), like e.g. Buddhism 
with its key concept of “dukkha” (usually translated as “suffering”), which 
describes a totally different attitude of mankind towards its earthly existence. 
In Buddhist teaching, man was not made in God’s image as the designated 
ruler of the world; he is rather an incomplete being, subject to the cosmic 
forces, which he has to endure, not control. This broadening of the perspective 
makes clear that there is a counterpart to the Western conception of “homo 
4  Translation by A.G. The German original reads: »das Vermögen, sich gegen fremde Kräfte 
durchzusetzen«.
5  Translation by A.G. The German original reads: »Konzeption des Menschen als Macht«.   A. Goettlich – Power and powerlessness  495
faber”, namely the idea of man being passively exposed to the powers of his 
natural and cultural surroundings. In applying this fundamental insight to the 
context of the present subject matter, it becomes clear that where there is 
superordination there is, at the same time, subordination (Simmel, 1967, p. 
181ff.).6 Sure, this basic societal fact has not escaped the social theorists of 
the “individualistic” paradigm, however most of them share the approach of 
Weber and treat subordination as a mere explanatory factor for superordination, 
rather than as a topic for research in itself. Regarding what has been said 
about underlying anthropological assumptions, one might suspect that within 
the relevant terminology of this paradigm there is a disposition towards 
considering power relations from the point of view of the performer of power, 
not from the perspective of those subject to power.
Still, it would be unfair to blame the cited philosophers for a determination 
to that effect. Marx was certainly aware of the other side of the coin, of mankind 
as a “suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants” (Marx, 
1961, p. 69; original emphasis). Plessner also seemed aware of its importance, 
as he devoted a separate chapter of his book Macht und menschliche Natur 
(Power and Human Nature) to the issue “Ohnmacht und Berechenbarkeit des 
Menschen” (“Powerlessness and the Predictability of Mankind”) (Plessner, 
1981, p. 221ff.).7 Thus, it is less philosophical theory itself, which is responsible 
for said bias of the “individualistic” paradigm, but more its reading by many 
sociologists. Maybe it is the historical heritage of sociology that is responsible 
for this reading – written history having always been the history of “great” 
men rather than the history of the powerless masses: “the history of political 
power … is elevated into the history of the world”, as Karl Popper observed in 
his Open Society (Popper, 2003, p. 299). Such a predisposition may be suitable 
for Weber’s interest in world history (“Universalgeschichte”), yet it is hardly 
compatible with a sociology of everyday life, which became increasingly 
important over the course of the 20th century.
In a certain sense the “individualistic” paradigm left the consideration of 
the subject of power’s perspective more or less to the “structuralistic” analysis 
where the individual is principally conceived of as a function of societal 
structures, that is, as a “subject” in the original meaning of the Latin word. 
Arguably the most prominent theory within this school of thought is Michel 
Foucault’s conception of subjectivism in which he regards the subject as the 
outcome of historical practices of discourse (Foucault, 1970). However, it is 
6  This idea can be found in, arguably, the most influential philosophical theory of power, that 
of Thomas Hobbes (1960). He clearly pointed out that the installation of the omnipotent 
Leviathan presupposes the abandonment of power by each individual citizen.
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quite obvious that this “structuralistic” approach cannot compensate for the 
shortcomings within the “individualistic” paradigm, since it gives no account 
of the subjective meaning of the analyzed structures, that is, the meaning it 
has for the individuals involved.
Against the background of this finding, this essay concerns itself with a 
theory rarely used in connection with the issue of power, namely Alfred Schutz’s 
theory of the life-world. Amongst social scientists Schutz has become known 
for trying to create a philosophical foundation for Max Weber’s Interpretive 
Sociology. To this end, he adopted subject-oriented philosophical theories, 
in particular the one of Edmund Husserl. His reference to a philosophy of 
consciousness has exposed Schutz’s social theory to a frequent criticism: it has 
often been cited as lacking the ability to consider power relations. Critics claim 
that the homunculi who populate the Schutzian life-world would negotiate 
the definition of their common situation on an equal footing in some kind 
of non-coercive universe of discourse. In the same vein, Schutz’s method 
of constructing a social theory by starting with the reflections of the solitary 
individual and adding the social layers bit by bit (Schutz, 1967) has been 
accused of being deceptive, since it allegedly ignores the fact of the individual’s 
ubiquitous interlacement within social structures of power.
In light of this critique of Schutz, it may seem peculiar to consult, of 
all things, his work in order to improve upon the sociological reflection on 
phenomena of power. I do so, because I think that there are certain concepts 
introduced by Schutz, which are fundamentally capable of responding to the 
deficiency described above. The concepts I have in mind originate from Schutz’s 
theory of relevance, which is commonly, and justifiably so, seen as part of (or 
as the phenomenological foundation of) a sociology of knowledge, since it 
describes the way in which an individual interprets his (social) surroundings. 
The  theory  of  relevance  is  therefore  integrated  into  the  chapter  entitled 
“Knowledge of the Life-World” in The Structures of the Life-World (Schutz 
and Luckmann, 1974, p. 99ff.). In spite of this original intention, the theory of 
relevance provides theoretical instruments which can be of original value for 
the analysis of power. Especially Schutz’s differentiation between “intrinsic” 
and “imposed” relevances8 establishes a useful concept in this respect. Thus, in 
the following I will discuss these concepts with reference to their adequacy for 
overcoming the one-sidedness of the “individualistic” paradigm. In order to do 
so it is essential to briefly introduce Schutz’s theory of relevance.
8  The grammatically incorrect plural “relevances” is built in accordance with Schutz, who, even 
though writing in English, obviously contemplated the subject matter while having the German 
concepts in mind. In his native tongue the plural “Relevanzen” is unproblematic.   A. Goettlich – Power and powerlessness  497
Alfred Schutz’s theory of relevance
By means of this theory Schutz tries to explain, in which way the ascription 
of relevance is constituted within the consciousness of an individual: how does 
it come about that a certain topic attracts attention, which aspects of the topic 
are recognized as being significant, which parts of the individual’s stock of 
knowledge are used for interpretation, and which motives exert an influence on 
this process? According to these questions, Schutz differentiates between three 
ideal types of relevance: (1) topical relevances, (2) interpretative relevances, 
subdivided into (a) those of the topic and (b) those of the stock of knowledge, 
and (3) motivational relevances.
(1) Topical  relevance  determines  toward  which  topic  an  individual 
directs his or her conscious intentionality. Generally speaking, topics become 
relevant to us, when they stand out against a background of familiar things: in 
the streets of Kabul a woman covered in a burqa does not attract attention – in 
the streets of Tucson, Arizona, however, she would. Such, topical relevances 
emerge when things become questionable and this can happen for certain 
specific reasons, which I will discuss later.
(2) Interpretative relevance of the topic determines which aspects of the 
thematic object are considered relevant for interpretation. Usually not every 
aspect of an object is relevant for its understanding. If I have a problem with 
my computer and call the telephone hotline, the consultant will not ask me 
about the computer’s color, but rather about technical details like the installed 
systems software or something similar. In the same way, not every part of my 
stock of knowledge is relevant for interpreting a single topic. My knowledge 
about German football players is to no avail when it comes to writing a 
scientific paper about the phenomenon of power. The interpretative relevance 
of the stock of knowledge determines which parts of the latter are used for 
interpretation. This applies to those of our previous experiences which appear 
to have some sort of similarity to the new topic and thus provide a type under 
which the unfamiliar object may be subsumed.9
(3) Motivational relevance refers to the “adequate ground” (Weber, 1968, 
p. 11) of human behavior. Schutz generally adopts Weber’s conception of 
motive, yet he makes a differentiation that goes beyond Weber:
First there appears to me, as the meaningful ground of my behavior, 
a series of future events whose occurrence I propose to bring about. 
I am orienting my behavior to this end. But there is a second sense in 
9  Schutz borrows the concept of type, which is essential for his thinking in general, from the 
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which I sometimes speak of the meaningful ground of my behavior. 
Here I refer to those past experiences of mine which have led me to 
behave as I do (Schutz, 1967, p. 28).
Schutz calls the former “in-order-to-motives”, and the latter “because-
of-motives”. In-order-to-motives principally refer to because-of-motives since 
projects of action, which are oriented toward the future, always build on the 
basis of dispositions, which lie in the past. For instance, when I eat ice-cream I 
do so because in the past equivalent actions proved to be positive experiences, 
and I do so in order to get this sensation again. 
As man is a creature of habit (Gehlen, 1988), relevances are not formed 
anew in each new situation. Relevances which have stood the test of time 
become a kind of “recipe”. If the interpretation of a situation fulfills my given 
pragmatic objective, the according relevances become part of my stock of 
knowledge – this knowledge then “sediments”, according to Schutz. Whenever 
I encounter a similar situation, I can draw on this knowledge in order to cope 
with the circumstances, and every time I succeed by applying formerly used 
relevances these become more firmly rooted. Thus, I develop typical relevances 
for typical situations: the thematic horizon is pre-established, I know which 
aspects I have to consider and which I can ignore, I know which patterns of 
interpretation are adequate, and I also know if certain motives are appropriate 
or not. In this way, systems of relevance emerge which are relatively stable. 
Certainly, when coming into a situation which is genuinely new, my ad-
hoc-interpretation might fail, but in the recurring situations of everyday life 
my “recipe” usually does the trick. And since such daily circumstances are 
typically the same for social groups, milieus, or even whole societies, systems 
of relevance are shared intersubjectively: “the world taken for granted by the 
in-group is a world of a common situation within which common problems 
emerge within a common horizon, problems requiring typical solutions by 
typical means for bringing about typical ends” (Schutz, 1964a, p. 236).
The possible significance of the theory of relevance for the analysis 
of  phenomena  of  power  becomes  clear  when  we  look  at  another  basic 
differentiation of Schutz. He subdivides all three types of relevance into 
the categories of “intrinsic” and “imposed” relevances, thereby taking into 
account the idea that relevances can be experienced as voluntary or involuntary 
(analogously he sometimes speaks of “free” and “bound” relevances). Schutz 
applies this differentiation to his three ideal types as follows:
(1) An  “intrinsic”  topical  relevance  originates  when  an  individual 
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thematic horizon, for instance when changing the topic of investigation or 
engaging in the further development of an existing topic. In contrast, an 
“imposed” topical relevance is caused by an interruption of either of the 
idealizations of the life-world, that is, the idealization of “I-can-do-it-again” 
or of “and so on”.10 Such an interruption forces the individual to deal with a 
thematic object that he would not have dealt with of his own free will.
(2) An  “intrinsic”  interpretative  relevance  originates  when  there  is 
an interpretation problem, that is, when the new topic does not adequately 
conform to the existing knowledge at hand and an adequate interpretation 
cannot be reached. If, on the other hand, the new topic fits exactly into the 
patterns of the ready-made stock of knowledge, then the interpretation happens 
as some kind of routine, quasi-automatically, in which case Schutz speaks of 
an “imposed” interpretative relevance.
(3) Finally, in the case of motivational relevance the difference between 
“intrinsic” and “imposed” relevances is the same as that between in-order-to 
and because-of motives. Schutz principally defines the former as “intrinsic” 
motives, as they are projected into the future, whereas the latter are generally 
said to be “imposed” motives, as they are determined by dispositions which 
lie in the past, like, for instance, character traits.
Relevance and power
As has already been stated, my thesis claims that the introduction of the 
differentiation between “intrinsic” and “imposed” relevances into a theory of 
power may help to correct the above mentioned bias within the “individualistic” 
paradigm. In amplifying the considerations of Weber, Schutz’s distinction 
shows us that powerlessness is not simply the absence of power (or, modifying 
Weber’s definition: the improbability of carrying out one’s own will within 
a social relationship), but it is instead to act in accordance with “imposed” 
relevances – be them of a topical, interpretative, or motivational nature. Schutz 
himself makes similar use of his theory in his essay “Equality and the Meaning 
Structure of the Social World” (1964a), in which he applies his theoretical 
concepts to various empirical phenomena, like e.g. racial discrimination. He 
shows that the self-interpretation of an in-group must necessarily differ from 
the interpretation of this very group by any out-group, because of differing 
systems of relevance. Initially, being dark-skinned may not be of excessively 
high relevance for a US-citizen of Afro-American origin, but when living in 
a society where the color of one’s skin serves as a criterion for discrimination 
and consequently for the unequal treatment of social groups, maybe even 
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before law, then this subjectively less important feature becomes highly 
relevant for him. The “objective” (in the Weberian sense) interpretation by 
the out-group superposes itself on his self-interpretation, it forces him to adopt 
certain relevances and to behave in accordance with them; to some extent 
it even constitutes his belonging to the in-group in the first place. Schutz’s 
theory of relevance opens up a theoretical approach that goes beyond the 
rather limited statement that such a person is subject to prejudice. It provides 
a differentiated tool for empirical analysis by considering the perspective of 
powerlessness as experienced by the individuals concerned.
Furthermore, its orientation towards a sociology of knowledge allows 
for a differentiated description of the use of definitional power, that is, 
the power of someone who is able to provide authoritative definitions of 
situations. In every society such definitions (which are of special importance 
within media democracies) are conceded to certain persons like incumbents, 
experts, religious leaders, etc. Using Schutz’s terminology, such persons 
declare certain systems of relevance, including topical, interpretative, and 
motivational relevances, as binding. A person, who can successfully do this 
and who is able to provide a socially approved definition of the situation, 
has power, as this person is to some degree able to influence the resulting 
action, since different definitions of the situation suggest different actions. 
For example, when a politician declares that the nation is acutely threatened 
by terrorists, he puts national security high on the political agenda, thereby 
repressing other topical relevances. When he states that said terrorists are 
driven by a murderous, fundamentalist ideology, he uses a certain pattern of 
interpretation, thereby excluding others. And when he claims that the “war on 
terror” has to be fought with regard to the global installation of democracy, 
he favors a particular motive, thereby neglecting others. If his statements are 
combined with a political will (which we can generally assume), they are 
part of an exercise of power. The example shows that Schutz’s typification 
allows us to precisely analyze the performance of definitional power, because 
it makes it possible to identify the exact “locus” of this performance: is it 
the limiting of the thematic horizon, the exclusion of certain interpretational 
patterns, or the preference for a particular motive?11
Surely, this kind of performance of power only works if the definition 
given  by  the  particular  person  is  commonly  accepted.  Schutz  basically 
11   Weber’s famous study on protestant ethics (Weber 2002) can be used as an illustration: the 
seminal influence of Luther’s and Calvin’s teachings was that it instructed their believers to 
consider a certain part of their lives as the most important topical relevance (profession), 
to interpret this part in accordance with a certain interpretational relevance (the doctrine of 
predestination), and to strive after the same motivational relevance (the quest for salvation).   A. Goettlich – Power and powerlessness  501
provides two explanations for how such common acceptance is to be achieved: 
the social derivation of knowledge and its social acceptance, which point 
to the fundamental concepts of the “sedimentation of knowledge” (Schutz, 
1967, §14) and the “reciprocity of perspectives” (Schutz, 1962, p. 11ff.). His 
phenomenologically oriented reflections open up the way for empirical studies. 
Berger and Luckmann’s famous book on The Social Construction of Reality 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967) is a prominent example of an effort to build a 
social theory on the basis of Schutz’s concepts.
The two above delineated aspects – the allowance for the perspective 
of the powerless and a detailed description of the functionality of definitional 
power – illustrate the principal usefulness of Schutz’s theory of relevance for 
certain problems within the context of power analysis. However, the application 
of this theory also poses a problem, which I would like to introduce by going 
back to Weber’s definition of power. Its English translation has already been 
cited above, yet it is important to note that this translation distorts the primary 
intent of the German original, as the formulation “despite resistance” insinuates 
that the existence of a resisting will is a presupposition when we speak of 
power. Yet, Weber also speaks of power in cases where there is no resisting 
will. In the German original it says “auch gegen Widerstreben” – “even despite 
resistance” (emphasis added), which allows one to also read what is implied: 
not only against opposition.
So, according to Weber, power may also be performed in cases where 
there is no resisting will on the part of the person it is acted upon, that is, when 
the latter does not experience the power performed over him as coercion. 
Paraphrasing this insight using Schutz’s terminology we can state that power 
is not only performed by imposing one’s own relevances on another person 
against her will, that is, when two conflicting systems of relevance exist. 
Power can also be performed by defining one’s own relevances as common 
ones, that is, when only one system of relevance exists and the according 
projects of action are experienced by every person involved as if they would 
emanate from his own free will. Now, this finding brings us into some trouble, 
inasmuch as it questions the thesis expressed above, namely the principal 
usefulness of the Schutzian distinction between “imposed” and “intrinsic” 
relevances for the purposes of power analysis: if behavior based on relevances 
that are subjectively experienced as “intrinsic” can be “bound” as well, then is 
the differentiation of any avail at all?
This is a fundamental question to be dealt with when suggesting that 
Schutz’s concepts can be used for an improved analysis of power. The following 
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Integration
With reference to said intention, the main problem resulted from our 
focusing on the point of view of those subject to power (according to our initial 
aim of inquiry). Thus it seemed that the answer to the question of whether a 
sociologist is confronted with a case where power is performed or not depends 
on whether the social actors experience the according relevances as “imposed” 
or “free”. Weber’s definition of power, as quoted above, demonstrates the 
dubiety of such a criterion for sociological purposes, because it runs the 
risk of neglecting that particular sort of “power which generates deliberate, 
consenting willingness to comply” (Popitz, 1992, p. 28)12. Schutz himself 
was aware of this problem: “The concept of imposed relevances applied to 
social relationships does not contain any reference to the problem of whether 
or not the imposition involved is accepted by the partner”, he writes in his 
essay “The Well-informed Citizen” (1964b, p. 128). Consequently, one has 
to look for a different criterion for identifying power. It is obvious to search 
for this criterion by reflecting the perspective of those performing power, like 
in Weber’s definition: the chance to carry out one’s own will within a social 
relationship.
At this point, the question arises whether the performance of power is 
always experienced as oppression by the social counterpart. Another passage 
from Schutz’s essay, in which he reflects on the relationship of the fictitious 
persons Peter and Paul, seems to answer positively: “In so far as Peter is the 
object of Paul’s action and has to take into account Paul’s specific goals which 
he, Peter, does not share, Paul’s intrinsic relevances are to Peter imposed 
relevances and vice versa” (ibid.). This statement suggests that we can identify 
the imposed relevances of those subject to power by recognizing the intrinsic 
relevances of those performing power, since the concepts correspond each 
other. However, this suggestion presupposes that we can exclude in the forerun 
those relevances, which are intrinsic to Peter and Paul. But there is a basic bias 
when we confine ourselves to the description of the ego’s consciousness:13 if we 
accept the plausible assumption that the actor is primarily aware of his intrinsic 
in-order-to motives whereas he tends to lose sight of his imposed because-of-
motives (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974, 219f.; Schutz, 1967, p. 130f.), we must 
conclude that actors live their lives with a chronic over-estimation of their 
freedom of action. As sociologists, we should be rather skeptical about the 
12  Translation by A.G. The German original reads: “eine Macht, die willentliche, einwilligende 
Folgebereitschaft erzeugt.”
13  For the purpose of illustration, in the following I will focus on motivational relevances only; 
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perception of such individuals, especially when reflecting on power. Moreover, 
the proposition of said correspondence can be contested with hindsight to those 
cases where the intrinsic relevances of Peter are irrelevant to Paul, which does 
not seem uncommon especially in relationships characterized by a high degree 
of anonymity.
For the scientist, the solution must be to move on from the subjective 
perspectives of the afflicted persons and to turn towards the objective perspective 
of the detached observer. Within the context of Interpretive Sociology this does 
not mean to ignore the subjective views, but in the contrary to hermeneutically 
reconstruct them and to transpose them into a different system of relevances 
– to create a “second-order-construct” out of a “first-order-construct” in the 
terms of Schutz.14 This detachment from the subjective meaning opens the 
“individualistic” paradigm for the consideration of structural moments.
Now, Schutz’s terminology creates certain problems when we try to use 
the theory of relevance in such a way for an empirical description of social 
reality – or to put it differently: when we try to make sociological use of the 
phenomenological concept of relevance. The first problem is explicitly stated 
in The Structures of the Life-world:
In short, plans are embedded in plan hierarchies, which finally refer 
to the limits of the human situation in the life-world. This means that 
either immediately, or at least mediately, all conduct can be ordered 
in contexts of ‘free’ motivational relevance. Vice versa, however, in 
principle every act and all conduct have a ‘history’. A ‘first’ project 
is […] unimaginable. Fundamentally, all conduct and every act can 
be understood in contexts of ‘bound’ motivational relevance (Schütz 
and Luckmann, 1974, p. 222f.) 15
This shows that the answer to the question whether a concrete action 
is “intrinsic” or “imposed” depends on the particular perspective: if I look at 
the previous because-of-motives of an individual, the action will appear to be 
imposed, if I look at the projected in-order-to motives the action appears to be 
intrinsic. Clearly such indecisiveness is not very helpful if one wants to make 
an empirical statement about the actual compulsory framework of a particular 
action or behavior.
The second problem is one that Schutz was not aware of, as far as I 
can see. The a priori definition of because-of-motives as “imposed” and of 
14  The distinction between “first-order” and “second-order”-constructs is explicated in Schutz 
1962: 5ff.
15  This phrasing is reminiscent of Kant’s Third Antinomy of Pure Reason (Kant, 1996, p. B 
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in-order-to-motives as “intrinsic” violates the “postulate of adequacy”.16 For 
instance, when Schutz states that from a psychological point of view the 
particular complex of because-of-motives of an individual can be described as 
the “character” of this person (Schutz, 1970, p. 66), this would mean that our 
character is something which is “imposed” upon us. This is not the way people 
think of their personality in everyday life, at least not exclusively. Furthermore, 
when Schutz says that in-order-to-motives are principally “intrinsic” this 
conflicts with our common sense thinking. Imagine for example a robbery 
where the victim hands over his money to a criminal in order to not get shot. 
In this way, the “second-order-constructs” of the theory of relevance stand in 
contradiction to the “first-order-constructs” of our daily experience.
I think the reason that Schutz violates the postulate of adequacy lies in the 
fact that our common sense emphasizes one aspect of our actions that is widely 
neglected in the theory of relevance, namely social coercion. This aspect of the 
theory only gets explicitly mentioned in The Structures of the Life-World, that 
is, in the further development of Schutz’s theory by Thomas Luckmann after 
Schutz’s death, but not in the original draft itself.17 And it is significant for 
Luckmann’s treatment of social coercion that it has no systematic place in the 
theory of relevance, it only gets mentioned sporadically throughout his text.
This specific shortcoming of the theory of relevance – or within the given 
context: of an application of this theory to social phenomena of power – can 
be explained by contemplating Schutz’s basic approach. In his Reflections on 
the Problem of Relevance he consciously makes use of the methodological 
“fiction  that  this  problem  can  be  studied  for  a  supposedly  isolated  mind 
without any reference to sociality” (Schutz, 1970, p. 134). Like in his book 
The Phenomenology of the Social World (1967) he uses a method of analysis 
which is the exact opposite of the phenomenological method of epoché: he 
begins with reflections about the constitutive acts of the ego’s consciousness 
and later seeks to broaden his scope of analysis by looking at the alter ego as 
well. Now, the problem is that Schutz never concluded his studies by adding 
the latter analysis; his theory of relevance remains a fragment.
Choosing the “isolated individual experienc[ing] the world of nature 
disconnected from his fellowmen” (Schutz, 1970, p. 73) as a starting point for 
16  “Each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a 
human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the 
typical construct would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men 
in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life” (Schutz, 1962, p. 44).
17  In the same way, the excerpts from “The Well-informed Citizen“ quoted above are not part of 
the original theoretical draft but instead applications of some of its concepts. Therefore they 
do not provide counterevidence to the statement that social coercion is neglected in the theory 
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reflection means to delay the consideration of social coercion to a later stage, 
and so Schutz works with a definition of “imposed” and “intrinsic” relevances 
which is by necessity preliminary. Summarizing Schutz’s arguments one can 
say that “imposed” relevances are relevances which lie either in the past or in 
a latent, subconscious layer of the individual’s mind and therefore beyond the 
rational influence of the actor. On the other hand, “intrinsic” relevances are such 
relevances which refer to future actions and which the individual actor is aware 
of. With this adumbration of the border between “imposed” and “intrinsic” 
relevances Schutz certainly makes a valid argument. The criteria of time and 
latency definitely play an important role in the problem under scrutiny: the force 
of habit can hardly be overestimated, and it seems sound to describe a relevance 
that the actor is not aware of as “bound”. Nevertheless, because of the volitional 
narrowness of his methodological approach Schutz only tells half the story. By 
focusing on the solitary individual, he sticks to the question of inner freedom 
and neglects any consideration of outer freedom, which can only be analyzed 
by taking the social context into account.
In order to overcome the described deficits, the perspective needs to 
be broadened by analyzing not only “the isolated individual’s experiences” 
(Schutz, 1970, p. 52), but also the experiences of the socialized individual. 
Schutz intended to take this next step himself, so it can be regarded as a 
completion of his theory of relevance. Yet, it would be erroneous to simply 
add social coercion as a third type of way in which relevances can be imposed, 
alongside the phenomena of latency and time as reflected by Schutz. In fact, 
the objective must be to cross-reference the different aspects. Especially with 
regard to the performance of definitional power Schutz’s differentiation between 
“monothetic” and “polythetic” reconstruction provides a promising tool for this 
kind of approach.18
Conclusion
The previous discussion of the difficulty of a direct application of 
Schutz’s concepts to a sociological study on power makes clear that the theory 
of relevance cannot serve as a substitution, but only as a selective amendment 
to existing theories on the subject. Such an amendment is conceivable despite 
the fact that this theory in its posthumous form is not a theory of power – not 
even a social theory as such.
18  Yet his tendency to identify “monothetic” reconstruction with belief in another person’s 
authority (Schutz, 1970, p. 84f.) is too simple and needs further clarification, as Ronald Cox 
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This paper argued that an extension of Schutz’s theory of relevance can 
be useful for a sociology of power which intends to broaden its considerations 
to the point of view of those subject to power, thereby overcoming the deficit 
diagnosed in chapter one. For this purpose, the concept of “imposed relevances” 
is of fundamental value. Although the according orientation alone cannot be 
expedient for an analysis of the phenomenon (the same goes for the exclusive 
focusing on the subjective view of the performer of power), its involvement is 
indispensable with regard to a comprehensive scientific coverage of the topic. 
And it carries the general caveat regarding a reification of “objective” elements 
over to the sociology of power, by reminding us that structures of power only 
gain significance through their subjective interpretation by social actors.
In general, accounting for those, who are exposed to the power of others, 
can be seen as a “democratization” of the sociology of power, inasmuch 
as it considers the perspective of the masses as in contradistinction to the 
“power elite” (Mills, 1978). This goes hand in hand with a turn towards the 
consideration of everyday life, where we all regularly have to come to terms 
with relevances imposed on us by others. Such problems are common topics of 
sociological research practice, e.g. within the sociology of work or migration, 
yet an adequate reflection in terms of the theoretical conceptualizing of power 
relations is still lacking. If the “will to power” (Nietzsche) is in fact part of the 
human condition, then there must be people exposed to power in every given 
society at any time, and sociology is constrained to not ignore this group.
In  addition,  Schutz’s  thoughts  remind  us  that  the  fundamental 
powerfulness of man, described by thinkers like Helmuth Plessner, not only 
refers to the active manipulation of his (natural) environment, but also to 
the interpretive construction of his (cultural) surrounding. The ideal typical 
differentiation between topical, interpretative, and motivational relevance 
allows us to precisely analyze this form of definitional power. Schutz himself, 
when applying his general theory of relevance to social relations, seemed 
to conceive of its epistemic orientation as some kind of limitation. In his 
aforementioned essay on “Equality” he remarks that racial discrimination can 
only work if there is an asymmetric allocation of political power, enabling the 
out-group to impose its interpretation on the in-group. Thus it seems that Schutz 
would have thought of the application of his concepts within a sociological 
research on power as a mere means of describing certain consequences of 
existing distributions of political power, without being able to provide a basic 
explanation about the phenomenon of power. However, I think that we need not 
share his skepticism, since we can easily reverse Schutz’s argument: political 
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of society and its structure. And on that note we can say that he who has 
definitional power is principally able to determine the boundaries of political 
power. Heinrich Popitz rightly conceives of definitional power (he calls it 
“authoritative power”; 1992, p. 29) as one of four anthropological basic forms 
of power (1992, p. 22ff.), and this is why sociological research on power 
should not abandon the input of a sociology of knowledge. Alfred Schutz’s 
theory of relevance bears precious insights in this respect.
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